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Abstract – The inequality of wealth distribution is a universal phenomenon in the civilized
nations, and it is often imputed to the Matthew effect, that is, the rich get richer and the poor get
poorer. Some philosophers unjustified this phenomenon and tried to put the human civilization
upon the evenness of wealth. Noticing the facts that 1) the emergence of the centralism is the
starting point of human civilization, i.e., people in a society were organized hierarchically, 2)
the inequality of wealth emerges simultaneously, this paper proposes a wealth distribution model
based on the hidden tree structure from the viewpoint of complex network. This model considers
the organized structure of people in a society as a hidden tree, and the cooperations among
human beings as the transactions on the hidden tree, thereby explains the distribution of wealth.
This model shows that the scale-free phenomenon of wealth distribution can be produced by the
cascade controlling of human society, that is, the inequality of wealth can parasitize in the social
organizations, such that any actions in eliminating the unequal wealth distribution would lead
to the destroy of social or economic structures, resulting in the collapse of the economic system,
therefore, would fail in vain.
The inequality of the wealth distribution is a univer-
sal phenomenon in the civilized nations, that is, most of
people would have little wealth, and a few people would
hold most. All the countries during most of the histori-
cal periods would obey this law [1], including the ancient
Egyptian dynasty [2], the modern Europe, the up-to-date
USA, Japan, India [3].
The inequality is often regarded to following the
Matthew effect, which says that - the rich get richer and
the poor get poorer. This effect implies that most of peo-
ple, the poor, will face a more and more miserable cir-
cumstance; and the rich, will thrive forever. The Matthew
effect claims an irresistible process and is a popular mech-
anism explanation to the inequality of wealth.
Numerous philosophers unjustified this inequality phe-
nomenon and believed that all the creatures should be
equally treated and be assigned the equal wealth. Under
this idea, some nations were set up, for examples, the So-
viet Union, the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom (1851-1864 in
southern China) and other governments. These govern-
ments legislated the equal wealth distribution, but they
failed finally due to serious economic depressions. Seemly
the inequality phenomenon is natural and inevitable.
But why such an inequitable phenomenon can dominate
human society? Does there exist a solution that can put
the civilization upon the fair wealth distribution? Scien-
tists have been addressing these problems.
Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto was a pioneer scien-
tist. He proposed that the personal wealth would obey the
power-law distribution [4]. Then Yule proposed a mecha-
nism named “Yule Process” to explain many scaling phe-
nomena in various fields based on “growth” [5, 6]. Ob-
viously, the growth implies that the power-law distribu-
tion would depend on the lapse of time. Sorin Solomon
et al. convinced that current personal wealth distribu-
tion is power-law [7–9], they also suggested that market
is the source of the extreme wealth inequality, and used
the Generalised Lotka Volterra model [10] to explain this
phenomenon. Furthermore, Solomon et al. explored the
relationship between market size and market instability
[11], and drew a conclusion that world-size global markets
lead to economic instability [12].
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In general, a lot of researches impute the origin of in-
equality to the market, or the investment. With the lapse
of time, the market or the investment would form a posi-
tive feedback, which make the rich more successful in the
future. Mathematically, this explanation can also fit the
curve of wealth distribution quite well.
On the other hand, the researches on complex network
can contribute some useful ideas to our understanding of
the wealth distribution [13–15]. All of us knew that the
complex systems can often be modeled as Complex Net-
works [16]. Since there exist many scaling phenomena
in complex systems, hence, some complex networks, such
as the Scientific Collaboration Networks [17], the World
Wide Web [13] etc., are scale-free. That is, their degree
distributions obey the power-law distribution. To illus-
trate the mechanism of the Scientific Collaboration Net-
works, Price proposed the concept of accumulative advan-
tage [17]. Later, Merton coined the accumulative advan-
tage processes as the Matthew effect [18]. To explain the
mechanism of the World Wide Web, the pioneer scientist
Baraba´si et al. also proposed a model named the growth
with Preferential attachment. Both explanations are sim-
ilar to the positive feedback. For the scale-free networks,
notice that when we map the degree to the fortune, so that
the mechanisms of the scale-free networks can be regarded
as the mechanism of wealth distribution and explain the
origin of wealth inequality.
From above, the positive feedback, or the Matthew ef-
fect is a popular and reasonable explanation.
However, the Matthew effect is more likely a phe-
nomenon, not the fundamental fact.
Seemly, when we focus on the phenomenon of wealth
condensation, this phenomenon is easy to understand,
since the rich can invest in new sources of creating wealth,
so that the richer the rich are, the more they can earn.
This process would repeat and repeat, the richer would
get richer.
But the reality is not like this. John D. Rockefeller
was the first billionaire on the earth, but his heirs have to
envy the eminence of their ancient now, even if they are
smart enough and the economy of USA increases continu-
ally. Not only Rockefeller family, the other richest families
in that age also encounter this problem. Of course, the
richest men/women in current world can not yet escape
from this principle. Probably, at least, the Matthew effect
does not work on the richest families. The winners can not
take all, the poor can become the richest, for example, the
founders of Google, Facebook and Twitter etc..
On the other hand, suppose that we leave a small
amount of money on deposit and then sleeping for sev-
eral hundred years, theoretically our offsprings will have a
great amount of wealth through the action of compound
interest. Unfortunately, historical real rates of return show
that the effects of taxation and inflation would likely cut
the money off, less than the amount that had been de-
posited. This result implies that the Matthew effect does
not hold in long run and does not work on the common
population.
From the cases above, seemly the Matthew effect is
often a theoretical process from the viewpoint of invest-
ment. Considering that most of current top richers in USA
didn’t accumulate their fortune from the capital market,
this viewpoint may not be fully reasonable for all circum-
stances.
Actually, the inequality of wealth has an another source.
The economists have deeply explored a universal phe-
nomenon, the hierarchy in the firms [19,20]. With the hi-
erarchy, the company managers are paid with much more
salaries and bonus than their less paid employees, how-
ever, the owners of a company would have much more
profit than the salaries and bonuses of the managers. Here,
the social position is positively related to the amount of
wealth. Furthermore, if we regarded the society as a set
of companies, then the wealth distribution could rely on
the hierarchy of company. That is, the disparity of wealth
may come from the structure of company.
If the disparity of wealth could come from the struc-
ture of companies, strictly, the tree-like cascade control-
ling structure, that means we cannot eliminate this kind
of disparity, unless we destroy the structure. That is, if
there is no structure, i.e., no company, so that no labor di-
vision, the society would return to the prehistorical state,
hence, economical products would fall into an ignorable
level. That is, the hypothesis on cascade controlling will
not only explain the wealth inequality, but also tell the
reason that the inequality is natural and infrangible.
In this paper, we design a model based on the hidden
tree structure [21,22], and proved that the trading actions
on this structure can produce a power law distribution
of wealth, meaning that the social cascading controlling
structure is one origin of wealth inequality. In contrast
to the explanation to the Matthew effect based on invest-
ment, the hidden structure model can explain more phe-
nomena on wealth distribution, and also produces phe-
nomenon similar to the Matthew effect.
Modeling. – When we consider the emergence of the
wealth, we can find that the wealth obviously relates to the
structure in ancient society. For example, the cacique in a
tribe would probably be the richest man in the eolithic age,
and the biggest slave owner, the king would probably be
the richest man in slavery society. From the experiences of
early human societies, the wealth may be closely positively
related to the social position in the society. In modern
societies, the richest men actually are the kings in their
fields.
Why does the wealth strongly relate to the social posi-
tion? We can use a simple example to illustrate it. If one
find that he can buy some apples from the providers and
then sell them to customers to make money, he would re-
peat his business, if the profit is enough. When the market
is big enough, he would find that he can employ another
person to help him. Obviously, the profit which is made by
the employer would be shared between the employee and
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the employer. The larger the business is, the more the em-
ployees can be employed, until the employer can employ
managers to help him, so a tree structure is built. In this
process, the wealth strongly relate to the social position,
does not strictly relate to the initial wealth distribution,
because of the cascade controlling. In this case, the poor
does not have a poor destiny, and the rich does not have
a fate to be richer. We can find many similar cases in the
real world. In a sense, this kind of tree-like cascade con-
trolling, actually is a hidden order [21–23] in the society,
therefore, we termed it as “hidden tree structure”.
The hidden tree structure means that: 1) it is a hier-
archical structure and reflects the social positions of the
individuals; 2) it is cascade controlling and by it the ran-
dom actions are organized; 3) it underlies in the social
phenomena and is the hidden order.
The hidden tree structure can produce the phenomenon
of the Matthew effect. When the business of employer is
growing bigger and bigger, and therefore richer and richer
in contrast of his employees, even if the employer does not
have a lot of cashes in the whole process. Of course, the
employer would hold much more fortune than the employ-
ees finally.
Though the effect of this mechanism satisfies the
Matthew effect roughly, whether this mechanism can ex-
plain the wealth distribution? If it works, the distribution
made by it should obey the power law distribution.
Assume that the society is an isolated system, every
person in this system is organized into a tree structure. In
the society, everyone survives on the services of the oth-
ers. That means, everyone should trade with the others.
When two persons have a transaction, they have to take
orders from their employers. To minimize the cost, the
participants should be minimized. That is, both sides in
a transaction would choose the shortest route. Because of
cascade controlling, this shortest path actually is the path
between these two persons in the tree structure.
Therefore, we design a model as follows.
Suppose that there are N individuals in the society. Let
Fi represents the wealth of the i-th individual. All individ-
uals are organized as a tree. Assume that every individual
except the leaf nodes has K son nodes. If K is a real
number, for example, 2.5, then the ancestor node would
certainly have 2 nodes and another one node with a prob-
ability of 0.5. Moreover, every individual has a ranking
number, representing its level in the tree. Here the rank-
ing number of root be 1, denoted as r(1) = 1, the ranking
number of the first son-node of root would be 2, and so
on. The hidden tree structure is illustrated in Fig. 1.
We then randomly choose two individuals to simulate
the transaction between them. For each transaction, there
is only a shortest path in the tree structure. Moreover, for
every transaction, we set the total value of one transac-
tion as 1, and the value would be assigned among the
individuals who participate the transaction. The assign-
ment function would be relative to the ranking numbers of
all participating individuals. For simplicity, assume that
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Level 4
Fig. 1: The sketch map of the hidden tree structure. The
hidden tree structure reflects the hidden order in the society,
or the cascade controlling relationships among the individuals.
Every node controls a few son nodes. K is the average of the
son nodes of all nodes except the leaf nodes and its value is
2.5.
the assignment function follows equation 1.
g(r) = rt (1)
Here r is the ranking number and t is the exponent.
Let the numbers of all the participating individuals be
l1, l2, ..., lp, then the assigned value of the lj node in one
transaction would follow the equation .
Flj =
g(r(lj))
s
(2)
Here,
s =
∑
p
g(r(lp)) (3)
We use Fig. 2 to illustrate the rules of transactions.
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Level 4
Fa=g(4)/s
Fb=g(3)/s
Fc=g(2)/s
Fd=g(1)/s
Fe=g(2)/s
Ff=g(3)/s
a
b
c
d
e
f
Fig. 2: The sketch map of a transaction on the hidden tree.
The node a proposes the transaction to node f . The red arrow
indicates that node a and node f are chosen, the profit should
be distributed among all the participants. The purple arrows
indicate the shortest path and the participating nodes in the
shortest path b, c, d, e between a and f , each of them will
obtain profit g(r)/s. s is the normalized factor and s = g(4) +
2g(3) + 2g(2) + g(1). Every node would accumulate its wealth
when the transactions continue to occur.
Every individual would trade many times with the other
individuals, so we use A to represent the number of trans-
actions that every node proposed. The wealth of arbitrary
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node would be the summary of all the participated trans-
actions.
Based on the model above, we prove that the distribu-
tion of wealth would obey the power law distribution by
the simulation and theoretical analysis. That is,
p(F ) ∼ F−γ (4)
Experimental Results and Analysis. – There are
four factors to the wealth distribution in this model.
Firstly, the population of individuals N ; Secondly, the
number of son nodes of every individuals K; Thirdly, the
times of transactions for every individual A; Finally, the
exponent value of the assignment function t.
For the first experiment, we set the population of soci-
ety as N = 1000, 2000, 5000, 10000, 20000, and the other
parameters K = 1.5 , A = 0.8, t = 0. We have such
distributions as in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 3: Wealth Cumulative Distribution When N Varies. This
figure uses the log-log coordination. All the curves approximate
linear, indicating that the distribution of wealth is power-law.
When the number of nodes N varies, the exponent γ does not
vary, meaning that N does not affect the exponent. At the tails
of curves, there are an exponential cutoff. When N increases,
the location of the cutoff moves right. That is, the finity of
nodes leads to the cutoff.
From Fig. 3, we can see that no matter how the popu-
lation varies, the distribution still follows the power law.
The next experiment is designed to check the impact of
the number of child nodes of every individual K. Here we
set K = 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3.5, 4, respectively, the other parame-
ters N = 10000, A = 0.4, g(r) = r0 = 1. We obtain the
distributions as in Fig. 4.
The third experiment is designed to check the impact
of the number of transactions A. Here we set A =
0.08, 0.16, 0.32, 0.64, 1.28, respectively, the other param-
eters N = 10000,K = 1.5, t = 0. We obtain such distri-
butions as in Fig. 5.
The last experiment is designed to check the impact
of the assignment function. We set the parameter t =
−1,−0.5, 0, 0.5, 1 respectively, and the other parameters
N = 10000,K = 2, A = 0.4.
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K=4.5
Fig. 4: Wealth Cumulative Distribution When K Varies. From
this figure, the curves approximate linear, indicating the power
law distribution for differentK. Some curves have waves which
come from the fact that every node has integral son nodes,
regardless of the real number K.
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A=1.28
Fig. 5: Wealth Distribution When A Varies. For this figure,
all the curves also approximate linear. When the number of
transactions increases, the wealth of every node would increase
with the same proportion, therefore, the curves can shift right
when A increase. Because the layer number is limited, the
curves show a cut-off.
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t=−1
t=−0.5
t=0
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t=1
Fig. 6: Wealth Distribution When t Varies. For different t,
all the curves approximate linear, but the slopes are obviously
different, suggesting that the assignment function can change
the exponent value drastically.
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From these experiments above, we can see that the
wealth distributions satisfy power law when the param-
eters varies. These results imply that the wealth distribu-
tions are robust when the individuals are organized as a
tree.
Theoretical Analysis. – Assume that the hidden
tree is a complete K-tree, the number of nodes N will be
determined by the number of layers M , so we have,
N=
KM+1−1
K− 1
(5)
To simplify the theoretical analysis, we consider a spe-
cial example, i.e., assuming that only the leaf nodes can
be chosen randomly, although the simulations allow all the
nodes to be selected randomly. For any node, its ranking
value r determines the number of its offspring nodes. Since
the hidden tree is regular and complete, the nodes in ev-
ery layer would have the same probability to be selected to
participate the transactions. Let us consider the root node
in a 3-tree, assume that the root node has three branches
a, b and c, we select two nodes in the leaf layer to perform
one transaction. Assume that the first node belongs to
the a branch, thus when the second node also belongs to
the a branch, the root would not participate the transac-
tion; when the second node belongs to the other branches,
the root would participate. Therefore, the root node has
a probability of 2/3 to participate the transaction. Simi-
larly, the probability of nodes in r-th layer would be (2/3)r.
Because the number of nodes in r-th layer would be 3r−1,
according to the exponential combination method [24–27],
the curve of the probability distribution of the participat-
ing transactions would be linear in the loglog coordination.
Generally, the probability of root node of a K-tree is
(K−1)/K, and the probability of nodes in r-th layer would
be ((K−1)/K)r, and the number of nodes in the r-th layer
would be Kr−1, the curve of the probability distribution
of the participating transactions still are linear in loglog
coordination.
Mathematically, the probability of the participating
transactions of a node in the r-th layer is,
D(r) ∼ (
K − 1
K
)
r
(6)
For any node, the probability that it has a ranking num-
ber r can be calculated by equation 7.
p(r) ∼
Kr−1
N
(1 ≤ r ≤ M) (7)
So we have,
p(D) ∼ D−1−
ln(K)
ln(K)−ln(K−1) (8)
So we have, the exponent γ = 1+ ln(K)
ln(K)−ln(K−1) . When
K = 2, γ = 2. According to equation , the slight changes
of K does not change γ greatly.
Notice the equation 1, when t = 0, we have,
p(F ) ∼ F−1−
ln(K)
ln(K)−ln(K−1) (9)
That is, the wealth distribution would obey power law.
Notice that we can create a scale-free network by adding
a simple rule that the first node of every transaction would
link to all the participants. Obviously, the degree distribu-
tion would be the same as the distribution of the variant
D. Moreover, the average shortest paths would vary ac-
cording to the parameter A [21, 22].
In general, the proposed model can produce the scale-
free network, simultaneously, the power-law wealth distri-
bution.
Discussions and Conclusions. – From the theoreti-
cal analysis and the simulation experiments, we can draw a
conclusion that the hidden tree structure does produce the
power-law wealth distribution. Compared to the positive-
feedback-like models, this model has some advantages.
Firstly, this model has total parallelism. The actions of
every nodes are not dependent to the others’, so that the
growth is not yet a necessary assumption. Secondly, the
investment is not the only source to determine the wealth
distribution. That is, the final individual wealth does not
certainly come from the advantages of initial wealth. Cre-
ativity, i.e., creating a new branch of the hidden tree, can
also produce immense wealth. Thirdly, the wealth distri-
bution does not rely on the unstable positive feedback. By
contraries, this model allows the stable structure, the hid-
den tree. Finally, the model is compatible to the Matthew
effect. The process of generating a branch can be regarded
as the examples of the Matthew effect.
Moreover, this hidden tree model means a lot to the
ideas on the wealth inequality. From this model, we can
see that the social structure leads to the wealth inequal-
ity. That is, according to the inverse theorem, if we want
to achieve the result of wealth evenness, we have to de-
stroy all the social/economic structures. Actually, the
social/economic structure relates to the labor divisions.
Since the labor divisions can empower the labor efficiency
hundreds of thousands of times, once the labor divisions
were destroyed, the products would drop drastically, that
means, the society would experience a serious economic
depression. This conclusion can be supported by the early
civilization. Thousands of years ago, human beings ac-
cepted the civilizations even if it often means the cruel
slavery, only because the social organization can provide
more products, i.e., more surviving opportunities to all.
Since our ancestors abandoned the wealth evenness, or
say, zero wealth, we can not go back.
When the exponent of the assignment function varies,
the exponent of power law of wealth distribution also
varies. That is, the assignment function can not founda-
tionally change the power-law wealth distribution, how-
ever, it still can adjust the inequality to some extent by
increasing more assigned value to the low-level nodes.
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In conclusion, although this paper drawn a pessimistic
conclusion, however, it simultaneously proved that human
beings are unnecessary to defy the natural principles, be-
cause we can modify the wealth distributing processes,
by taxing or other policies, so that the products increase
and are shared. Although the economic inequality is in-
evitable, even some regard it vicious, it still contributes
much to our world.
∗ ∗ ∗
Thanks to Dr. Oskar Burger, Dr. Chunlai Zhou,
Dr. Baobin Wang and Dr. Zhongxun Zhu for valuable
discussions and to Dr. Ting Hu for English improve-
ment. Supported by the State Key Laboratory of Net-
working and Switching Technology (No. SKLNST-2010-1-
04) and the National Natural Science Foundation of China
(No.60803095).
REFERENCES
[1] Levy M. and Solomon S., Physica A , 242 (1997) 90.
[2] Abul-Magd A. Y., Phys. Rev. E , 66 (2002) 057104.
[3] Chatterjee A., Sinha S. and Chakrabarti B. K.,
Current Science , 92 (2007) 1383.
[4] Pareto V., Cours d’Economie Politique (Droz, Geneva)
1896.
[5] Willis J. C. and Yule G. U., Nature , 109 (1922) 177.
[6] Yule G. U., Philos. Trans. R. Soc. London B , 213
(1925) 21.
[7] Levy M. and Solomon S., Physica A , 242 (1997) 90.
[8] Klass O., Biham O., Levy M., Malcai O. and
Solomon S., Eur. Phys. J. B , 55 (2007) 143.
[9] Klass O. S., Biham O., Levy M., Malcai O. and
Solomon S., Economics Letters , 90 (2006) 290.
[10] Solomon S. and Richmond P., Physica A , 299 (2001)
188.
[11] Huang Z.-F. and Solomon S., Physica A , 294 (2001)
503.
[12] Louzoun Y., Solomon S., Goldenberg J. and
Mazursky D., Artificial Life , 9 (2003) 357.
[13] Baraba´si A. L. and Albert R., Science , 286 (1999)
509.
[14] Hu M. B., Wang W.-X., Jiang R., Wu W.-S., Wang
B.-H. andWu Y.-H., The European Physical Journal B -
Condensed Matter and Complex Systems , 53 (2006) 273.
[15] Garlaschelli D. and Loffredo M. I., Journal of
Physics A , 41 (2008) 224018.
[16] Amaral L. A. N. and Ottino J. M., European Physical
Journal B , 38 (2004) 1434.
[17] Price D. J. d. S., Science , 149 (1965) 510.
[18] Merton R. K., Science , 159 (1968) 56.
[19] Miller G. J.,Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Econ-
omy of Hierarchy (the Press Syndicate of the University
of Cambridge) 1992.
[20] North D. C., Institutions, institutional change, and eco-
nomic performance (Cambridge University Press) 1990.
[21] Zheng B., Backbone and evolution in complex network
Postdoctoral report Tsinghua University (2009).
[22] Zheng B., Wang J., Chen G., Jiang J. and Shen X.,
Chin. Phys. Lett. , 28 (2011) 018901.
[23] Holland J. H., Hidden Order: How Adaptation Builds
Complexity (Addison-Wesley) 1995.
[24] Newman M. E. J., Contemporary Physics , 46 (2005)
323.
[25] Reed W. J. and Hughes B. D., PhysRev. E , 66 (2002)
067103.
[26] Miller G. A., American Journal of Psychology , 70
(1957) 311.
[27] Li W., IEEE Transactions on Information Theory , 38
(1992) 1842.
p-6
